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ABSTRACT 
This article proposes a new way of defining Katz’s natural languages. Katz defines natural 
languages as abstract objects, which are later understood as collections of sentences. This is 
due to the fact that linguistics is understood as a part of mathematics. He proposes a realist 
linguistics that is not easy to adopt. We think that a realist linguistics that does not consider 
that linguistics is a part of mathematics could be better embraced. If linguistics were not a 
part of mathematics, a new definition of natural languages as abstract entities should be 
provided. We propose to use a hierarchized ontology, and to define natural languages as 
linguistic states of affairs, which result from the instantiation of a linguistic property in lower 
level linguistic abstract entities. 
Keywords: Katz, Natural Languages, Linguistic Abstract Entities.
Introduction
A realist linguistics is difficult to defend. It is very counterintuitive. We are not used to think-
ing about natural languages as abstract objects. Even if philosophers such as Baker and Hacker 
(1984, p. 300-302) have defended that there is a mythology regarding a Platonic conception of 
rules, the defense of a realist (Platonic) linguistics—from a linguistic point of view—sounds very 
strange. However, this is exactly what Katz (1981) defends. Katz’s realist linguistics presents us 
with an interesting proposal, which no empirical linguist has seriously considered. Some of Katz’s 
ideas are very problematic, and present us with several challenges. Here we want to focus on his 
conception of natural language as an abstract object, and propose an alternative to his notion in 
a realist (Platonic) framework.
Katz’s proposal
Katz proposes a linguistic theory whose object of study is natural language, and he conceives 
natural language as an abstract object. To say that natural language is an abstract object is to say that 
it has nothing to do with our biological constitution, or with the constitution of the concrete things 
we may perceive in the world. To understand this idea, we need to be able to abstract away from 
what we can perceive, and the comparison with mathematics, numbers, and functions simplifies 
this task: you know that there are numbers and functions even though you cannot touch them, you 
cannot see them.3 Perhaps, by now, you are thinking that you can see numbers, that your teacher 
showed you how to write 2, 2+x, and you may think that those are numbers and functions. Howev-
er, there is no actual 2, and you cannot touch a function like 2+x—what you may see are numerals 
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(the inscriptions of the numbers and functions). If you write 
them in a different typeface they will still be the same numbers, 
and you will still have the same function. So, we may all agree 
that even though we all know what the number 2 is, we can 
neither touch it nor see it, which is a consequence of it being 
an abstract object.4 This is different to what may happen when 
your teacher shows you how to write dog. In that case, even be-
fore you knew how to write dog, you knew what dogs were: you 
saw dogs on the street, perhaps you owned one as a child. This 
is due to the fact that, contrary to numbers and functions, dogs 
are concrete objects. But what happens when your teacher tells 
you that dog is a word? It certainly seems to be related to those 
objects that you know, see, and perceive. But what is a word? 
This has been a topic of discussion in linguistics for a very long 
time, and not much agreement has been reached. This is why 
in linguistics the use of the term lexical item is preferred, because 
it avoids confusions involving the term word. However, even 
without taking those discussions into account, you probably 
are able to see the relation it may have with numbers: you can-
not touch the word dog; you cannot see it; it seems to work ex-
actly as 2 does. In accordance with this idea, a Platonist linguist 
who follows Katz would argue that words or lexical items like 
dog are abstract objects like numbers. They cannot be touched, 
but they are there, they are real. They are as real as a number, 
and we may study them. We may study words, sentences, and 
natural languages, which are all abstract objects.
Katz proposes a realist/Platonist linguistics because he 
acknowledges the abstractness of natural languages and ac-
cepts that reality is constituted by concrete objects as well 
as by abstract ones. These abstract objects are not created, 
they “have no origin and are not subject to causation” (Katz 
and Postal, 1991, p. 531). That is, if we accept that natural 
language is an abstract object we have to accept that humans 
did not create it, they merely discovered it, as we discovered 
numbers, atoms, and cells. Thus we should not confuse this 
abstractness with how it is usually used in linguistics: when 
we say that we may abstract grammar from data, for exam-
ple, we are  eaking about a formalization of empirical data; 
when Katz argues that natural language is an abstract object 
he is saying that it is completely independent from humans 
and any process of creation: “the language is a timeless, un-
changeable, objective structure” (Katz, 1981, p. 22).
Katz defines linguistic theory as the study of the invari-
ance in natural languages. That is, linguistic theory is involved 
in the study of linguistic universals: the features that are com-
mon to all natural languages, without which languages would 
not be effable (would not allow us to express every propo-
sition by some sentence). Katz think that two examples of 
linguistic universals are recursiveness and the principle of com-
positionality. The first says that we may have very complex 
sentences, which are allowed by recursion. For instance, we 
may see language recursion in the centre embedding that al-
lows us to embed a clause within another: The cat that the 
dog chased ate the rat (see Levinson, 2014, p. 3). The second is 
a reformulation of Frege’s compositionality principle with a 
relatively small modification (in italics). The principle could, 
then, be rephrased as saying that “the meaning of all the in-
finitely many sentences and other synta ically complex con-
stituents of a natural language except for a finite subset of them 
is a function of the meanings of their constituents and their 
synta ic structure” (Katz, 1981, p. 230). 
While linguistic theory studies the invariance across 
natural languages, grammar theories are in charge of study-
ing the  ecific languages and sentences of which it is com-
posed. Grammars “correctly predict grammatical properties 
and relations such as well-formedness” (Katz, 1981, p. 64), 
and have to be able to explain grammatical facts of languag-
es. The grammar has to be able to explain, for instance, that 
in natural languages there are analytic truths, such as If John 
killed Mary, then Mary is dead. In a theory like the one Katz 
proposes, this is explained by acknowledging that there is a 
link between logic and language that allows us to recognize 
that semantic implication may be “put on the same footing as 
logical implications” (Katz, 1981, p. 170). Thus, a relation be-
tween logic and language is recognized, and a more homoge-
neous treatment of both is defended. This approach seems to 
clearly explain the relations all linguists should see with logic 
in a very natural way: logic, language, and mathematics are all 
abstract objects and that’s what explains the fact that we can 
talk, for instance, about Fregean functions and arguments in 
logic, in linguistics, and in mathematics.
The fact that natural languages and sentences are abstract 
objects, that they cannot be seen, heard, or perceived, that we 
may not have causal relations with them, but we still may have 
knowledge of them, still needs to be explained. It would seem 
that if we cannot see or hear them, we should not be able to 
 eak or write. This raises the problem of access to abstract en-
tities: how can we know them if they are causally inert, do not 
exist in space and time, and are inaccessible to our senses? Katz, 
who proposes a solid theory of linguistics, answers these ques-
tions as follows: we have a faculty of intuition that allows us to 
grasp abstract objects, such as numbers, sets, natural languages, 
and sentences. This faculty of intuition, which has to do with 
the knowledge we may have of a language, is understood not as 
sensible intuition, but as intellectual or rational intuition. He 
combines a realist ontology that includes abstract objects with 
a rationalist epistemology, and tries to provide “realism with 
epistemological credibility and rationalism with ontological 
stability” (Katz, 1998, p. xxii). Intuition, then, would be a fac-
ulty that uses an act of apprehension that allows us to know a 
natural language. It is through intuition that we may know ab-
stract objects with which we have no causal relation. The fac-
ulty of intuition Katz proposes would be a general faculty, that 
is, it would allow us to grasp all abstract objects, not just natural 
4 Of course, this is so if you are positioned in a realist framework like the one Katz proposes. However, defining what a number is –even 
in a Platonist context– is not a simple task, as has been shown by Benacerraf’s work: What numbers could not be (Benacerraf, 1965).
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language: it is not language- ecific, which is compatible with 
the fact that for a Platonist, a linguist is a mathematician, who 
thinks that “linguistics is a mathematical science” (Katz, 1985, 
p. 24). Katz recognizes that the faculty of intuition is not suffi-
cient, that there must be other components that complement 
it. He proposes two extra components: one that allows us to 
explain how it is possible that our mental representations differ 
from the actual structure of natural language, and another that 
allows the faculty of intuition to reconstruct “representations 
of sentences as concrete concepts of abstract objects” (Katz, 
1981, p. 205).
Katz thinks that it is very important to separate a natu-
ral language from knowledge of that language. Studying natu-
ral languages is linguistics and part of mathematics. However, 
studying the knowledge of language is not linguistics and is not 
a part of mathematics. The knowledge of natural languages 
would be studied, in the case we were to follow Katz, by psy-
chology, more  ecifically by psycholinguistics. He argues that 
when we are thinking about what we produce, about what the 
recognition time of productions is, we are not studying the 
grammar of natural language but the knowledge that a  eak-
er-hearer has of a natural language. This is due to the fact that, 
when we are talking about knowledge of language (compe-
tence), other factors are involved that are not part of the struc-
ture of natural language. For instance, knowledge of a language 
involves biological features like memory limitation, which for-
bids humans to produce infinitely long sentences. However, 
this does not mean that natural languages cannot have infinite-
ly long sentences; it just means that humans have limitations 
on the knowledge they can grasp about that natural language.5 
Katz’s proposal is appealing because treating linguistics as 
a formal science allows us to explain at least some of the sim-
ilarities that are easily seen between linguistics and logic—like 
semantic implication and counterfactuals, for instance. It also 
provides us with an argument for why grammars—in Katz’s 
sense—almost never reflect people’s real use of language: 
grammars study the structure of natural language and not the 
knowledge people have of that language. However, several is-
sues arise here: how can we claim that natural languages are 
independent of humans? Why should linguistics be a part of 
mathematics? What does the faculty of intuition really do and 
how does it work? Why is the link between logic and linguistics 
so important? In this paper, we will focus on the question of 
the ontological status of natural languages, which arises from 
denying that linguistics is a part of mathematics.
A new definition of 
natural languages
The problem of the nature of natural languages arises 
from the idea that it is a mistake to consider linguistics a part 
of mathematics. Even though we agree partially with the idea 
that natural languages must be studied by a formal science, 
the linguist is not a mathematician. They share a common 
ground since mathematics, logic, linguistics, and computation 
sciences could all be seen as formal sciences that, from a re-
alist point of view, study abstract entities. However, we think 
that they should be differentiated, as we differentiate the sci-
ences that work with concrete objects (biology, chemistry, 
biochemistry, genetics, etc.), because they do not study the 
same object. Even though the faculty of intuition may be the 
same in grasping these abstract entities, this does not mean 
that they are the same entities, and nor does it mean that they 
should all be studied by mathematics and its “sub-sciences”. 
The analogy with concrete physical objects comes in handy 
again: even though we may use perception to study an animal 
and to study a rock, biology and geology are different sciences. 
Clearly, mathematics and linguistics are strongly related, but 
they are not the same science. Mathematics deals with num-
bers and functions, while linguistics in Katz’s sense deals with 
linguistic universals. Both are intimately related to logic, but 
neither of them are logic. We think, then, that Katz is right in 
postulating that linguistics is a formal science, but we think it 
should be independent of (though related to) mathematics. 
So, the nature of natural languages as collections of sentences 
has to be rethought, and a new definition of natural languages 
must be provided.
Whitehead and Russell (1910) proposed a hierarchy to 
solve the very well known paradoxes, which was created for 
mathematics—but may be related to linguistics. We think 
that we may use their hierarchy to analyse natural languages, 
since they are also abstract objects that are studied by a for-
mal science. The alternative we propose allows for a better 
definition of the ontological status of natural languages. It is 
based in a logic-ontological hierarchy like the one given by 
Chateaubriand (2001)—inspired by Whitehead and Russell 
(1910)—that includes objects, logical and non-logical prop-
erties, and states of affairs, and is a flexible and cumulative 
hierarchy. In our hierarchy, at level 0 we have concrete entities 
(objects and events), and from level 1 up we have abstract en-
tities, such as properties, facts, and states of affairs. Both facts 
and states of affairs are complex entities that result from the 
instantiation of a universal property in a concrete entity/ies 
or in an abstract entity/ies, re ectively. We have non-logical 
and logical properties. Non-logical properties appear at lev-
el 1, and logical properties may appear at different levels and 
combine with different types of entities, which makes our hi-
erarchy flexible and cumulative. 
We would like to propose that, in this hierarchized on-
tology created for mathematics and logics, it is possible to have 
linguistic abstract entities that may also be defined according 
to the place they occupy in the hierarchy. They belong to the 
same ontology, for even though they should be studied by dif-
5 See Langendoen and Postal (1984) for a proposal of natural languages that have infinitely long sentences.
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ferent sciences, they are abstract entities. As abstract entities 
they may be properties or states of affairs, and appear in level 1 
of the hierarchy for the first time. Linguistic properties will be 
all the linguistic items that may be combined with other linguis-
tic items (lexical items, grammatical rules, meaning, etc.). Lin-
guistic states of affairs will be the result of the instantiation of 
linguistic properties in other linguistic properties (for instance, 
the instantiation of the property being spoken American English, 
in the lexical item cat). The hierarchy, thus, results in a more 
complex and rich linguistic ontology than the one proposed 
by Katz. However, if the ontology only had sentences and col-
lections, and natural languages were defined as collections of 
sentences (following Katz), many linguistic phenomena that 
involve smaller linguistic units than sentences and “combina-
tions” of collections would not be explained. Our hierarchized 
ontology, in contrast, allows us to explain diverse linguistic phe-
nomena, such as linguistic change, the existence of dialects, so-
ciolects, and linguistic family trees, among others. 
But, before explaining those phenomena, we should de-
cide which linguistic entities appear at level 1 (which is not an 
easy task). On the one hand, it would seem that the phono-
logical level should be the first, since we could not have lexi-
cal items without phonological structure. Phonological rules 
and phonemes could be treated as abstract entities. They may 
be gra ed, someone may utter /o/, which means that they 
accessed the type of the phoneme and transformed it into a 
token. But do phonemes and phonological rules belong to the 
same level, or do phonological restrictions appear first, then 
phonemes form on a higher level, and then combine? This is 
not an easy question to answer, and more needs to be known 
about the nature of phonology before we can stipulate any 
answer. On the other hand, it seems that meaning should 
be prior. In fact, it seems that meaning should be universal 
(common to all natural languages), and thus everything lin-
guistic—even phonemes—should appear on higher levels 
than that of linguistic meaning. They could be considered 
linguistic primitives, and appear at level 1. Then, every other 
linguistic entity would be related to that meaning in a direct 
or indirect way, and exist from level 2 and up. However, this 
is not an easy problem to solve, because we should explain 
how we relate meaning to everything that is in the ontolo-
gy —which is not a task we undertake in this paper.
Another important feature that should be taken into ac-
count when trying to build a linguistic ontology is morphol-
ogy. Morphology is complicated, and defining where mor-
phemes stand is an even more complicated task. We would 
have to decide which is the best approach to morphology. Do 
we first have morphemes and morphological rules that form 
lexical items, and then go on to form sentences (which would 
seem similar to the ‘Weak Lexicalist Hypothesis’, like that 
proposed by Aronoff, 1976); or do we have all lexical items 
(including morphemes) on the same level and all the gram-
matical rules on a higher level which, once instantiated, have 
as a result lexical items, phrases, and sentences (which would 
be something like the ‘Distributed Morhpology’ framework, 
see Harley and Noyer, 1999)? Obviously, an answer to this 
question should be given, and it seems that the grammati-
cal rules used to form words and sentences are very similar, 
which should point to option number 2—but this should also 
be further studied. 
Discovering which level natural languages appear on for 
the first time is not an easy task, and is not one we can solve 
here. This is due to the fact that many linguistic problems are 
still not solved. Nevertheless, this does not mean that we are 
unable to explain how natural languages could be represented 
in a linguistic ontology like the one we propose. To do this, 
we may simplify our ontology, start with lexical items at lev-
el x, and accept that x is an undefined level that depends on 
how many levels turn out to come before the lexical items of 
a particular natural language are formed. We leave for future 
research, then, the levels that are yet to be completely discov-
ered, and start at x.
Starting at x
Let’s start at level x, because we still cannot say which 
level lexical items are found on. We may still consider lexi-
cal items as independent entities that can be combined with 
other lexical items. That is, lexical items could be treated as 
linguistic properties that are autonomous, and able to com-
bine with each other through grammatical rules. Since they 
are the most basic and simple abstract linguistic entities that 
may form phrases and sentences, they pertain to level x. Lex-
ical items have meaning and phonological structure (/kat/, 
for instance, would be a possible representation of a lexical 
item, and cat a simpler one). Then we would have grammati-
cal rules. Grammatical rules are properties that e ablish how 
those lexical items may be combined to form phrases and sen-
tences (‘a transitive verb combines a subject with a direct ob-
ject’, for instance, could be a possible representation of a gram-
matical rule), and, thus, should pertain to higher levels than 
that of lexical items. They should appear for the first time at 
x + 1. Phrases and sentences, then, result from the combina-
tion of lexical items and grammatical rules. We propose that 
phrases may be interpreted as the instantiation of a grammat-
ical rule in lexical items (by analogy with states of affairs), and 
thus they must belong to the level x + 1—the same level as 
the grammatical rules.  A level x + 1 phrase like the cat would 
be the instantiation of a grammatical rule in two lexical items 
the and cat. Sentences would result from the combination of 
level x + 2 rules and level x + 1 phrases. A level x + 2 sentence 
like Paula loves the cat, for instance, would be the result of the 
instantiation of several grammatical rules in several phrases.6 
6 By assuming this, we are assuming that lexical items alone cannot combine to form a sentence. So, even though, Paula may appear to 
be only a lexical item, it is a DP.
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Once we have sentences, we may have natural languages 
as level x + 3 entities (or linguistic states of affairs) that result 
from the instantiation of a property like being spoken American 
English in lower level abstract entities. This level x + 3 prop-
erty has a variable arity, and may be instantiated in a low-
er-level property (lexical items or grammatical rules) or state 
of affairs (phrases or sentences). However, it will be a natural 
language only in case it is instantiated in all the entities that 
pertain to spoken American English.7 This is due to the fact 
that we want it to be possible for a level x + 3 property like be-
ing spoken American English to be instantiated, for instance, in 
only one sentence, as in <being spoken American English, Paula 
loves Pedro>, as well as in all the sentences, all the grammatical 
rules, all the lexical items, and all the linguistic items that per-
tain to spoken American English. We can thus explain how 
we differentiate what belongs to English from what belongs 
to Spanish: only those entities in which being spoken American 
English is instantiated pertain to American English, and only 
those in which ser español rioplatense hablado is instantiated 
pertain to that variety of Spanish. This allows us to explain 
why we have dialects that pertain to a natural language. We 
could state that those level x + 3 states of affairs are Dialects 
of a level x + 4 Standard Variety, which would result from 
the instantiation of a property like being the Standard Variety 
of American English in lower level entities, which would itself 
account for standard languages of a given variety. That is, the 
standard language is the result of the combination of a level x 
+ 4 property with lower level entities that explain how we can 
have ‘one’ American English. 
Once we have those standard level x + 4 natural lan-
guages (NL), we may then have a level x + 5 NL which 
contains the common structure of all those standard level 
x + 4 NL that may be said to be English. In this case, we 
would have a property like being the Natural Language En-
glish that would be instantiated in lower level entities, and 
which would account for what is usually called English (or 
Spanish, or Chinese, etc.). This would explain why, even if 
it seems obvious that there is not a unique English, we may 
 eak of English as being one language: we talk about the 
common structure of different standard varieties of English 
(or any other language). We then would go up to level x + 6, 
in which the properties of being a Family of Natural Languages 
(FNL) appear for the first time. In this case, the property 
would be instantiated in level x + 5 Natural Languages, re-
sulting in the first branch of a linguistic family tree. After 
level x + 6 Family of NL, we would have a level x + 7 Family 
of NL that contains level x +6 FNL; and so on, until ev-
erything has been explained. This is an exciting idea that 
allows us to explain not only dialects and standard varieties, 
but also linguistic family trees: when we are doing typology, 
for instance, we are discovering those families of NL that 
belong to a higher level, say level x + 6, and to which level x 
+5  NL belong. 
We will illuminate our point with a rather simplified lin-
guistic family tree of the Germanic languages— ecifically the 
English branch (for further information see Mallory and Ad-
ams, 2006, Ch. 2.4). First, we start with level x + 3 NL which are 
those that result from the instantiation of a level x + 3 property 
in lower level entities (which may be level x + 2 sentences, or 
level x lexical items, etc.) and were spoken at some time but are 
not the standard varieties considered as level x + 4 NL. Then, 
in the case of the English branch, we would have the level x + 4 
standard varieties of Old English (spoken from 700–1100), of 
Middle English (spoken from 1100–1450), and of New English 
(spoken from 1450 until now, which should be further divided 
into the standard varieties of the dialects currently spoken in 
England, and other English- eaking countries). The standard 
varieties, level x + 4 NL, are not spoken by most members of 
the communities. They are studied by grammarians, they may 
be used by illustrated members of the community, but—since 
they include some items and disregard others—they may only 
be used by those that have studied the grammars of the vari-
eties. For instance, a  eech given by an outstanding member 
of English society would most probably be given in standard 
British English. After level x + 4, we would go up to level x + 5 
NL, which contains level x + 4 NL. They have a common lin-
guistic structure that allows us to classify them as English. Since 
level x + 5 NL contains natural languages of natural languages 
(and include their common structure), even though they are 
apprehended, they are not spoken. They might be studied by 
grammarians and compared to other level x + 5 NLs, but they 
are not spoken by communities (nor by those that may  eak 
the standard varieties). After level x + 5 English—which in-
cludes the common structure present in all level x + 4 English 
standard varieties —, we have a level x + 6 family of Natural 
Languages, which is Germanic, and which is composed of the 
following level x + 5 NL: English, Dutch, West Germanic, 
North Germanic, and East Germanic (which are constituted 
in a similar way to English). This is a relatively simple example, 
if compared to a whole tree, of how linguistic family trees may 
be explained by a proposal like ours. It could be followed by 
a Proto-Indo-European Family, which would be a higher-level 
natural language (as a linguistic state of affairs) that contains 
all the NL that are a part of it, but that would be better devel-
oped once we know exactly how the levels up to x + n work 
(for other groups that pertain to Indo-European and Proto-In-
do-Eruopean, see Mallory and Adams, 2006, table 1.6, p. 9). 
Concluding remarks
We think that our proposal goes hand in hand with 
Katz’s. It maintains that Natural Languages are abstract enti-
ties, and that linguistics is a formal science, though not a part 
of mathematics. The chara erization of NL according to the 
different levels of the hierarchized ontology presented seems 
7 We are using “spoken English”, because the level x + 3 natural languages would be the actual spoken varieties.
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to be a nice addition to Katz’s account because it allows us to 
explain how languages are related. It also allows us to avoid 
taking NL as abstract objects. Treating NLs as states of af-
fairs, as combinations of properties, allows us to explain NLs 
as complex entities that involve relations between different 
linguistic entities. On the first level analysed, x, we have lex-
ical items; on the second level analysed, x +1, we have gram-
matical rules which, combined with lexical items, result in 
level x + 1 phrases; on the third, x + 2, we have grammatical 
rules and sentences; on the fourth, x + 3, NLs (subdivided 
in dialects, standard varieties and NLs) appear; we then go 
up to the level on which families of NLs appear, but NLs do 
not appear on lower levels. This allows us to explain many 
linguistic phenomena that could not be explained if NLs were 
objects, such as collections of sentences. This notion of NLs 
obviously involves some problems that should be further in-
vestigated, as mentioned, but we are convinced that they are 
worth researching.
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